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"Selective Information is Misinformation"
Edward S. Herman
The Keynote Address given at the 2002 UDC Conference.
Edward S. Herman is a Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. He has a regular "Fog Watch" column in the monthly Z Magazine. Among his 22
published books are Manufacturing Consent (with Noam Chomsky. Pantheon, 1988, rev. 2002);
The Myth ofthe Liberal Media: An Edward Herman Reader (Peter Lang, 1999); and with
co-editor Philip Hammond. Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (pluto,
2(00). Herman was the recipient of the 2002 UDC Dallas Smythe Award.
The quotation in my title is from a recent decision by Judge
Damon Keith of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati in
which he ruled against Attorney-General John Ashcroft's attempt to
keep deportation hearings behind closed doors. The judge noted that
"when government begins closing doors, it selectively controls
information that rightly belongs to the people. Selective information
is misinformation.":
How profoundly applicable this is to the private commercial
media who close doors to dissident opinion as a matter of course and
also select information in their news columns in accord with favored
agendas! They select the topics to be covered, the sources to be
tapped and ignored, the frames used and context deemed appropriate
(if any), and what facts and allegations are to be admitted or excluded
on the permitted topics. They regularly participate in propaganda
campaigns that serve the state and divert attention from more
mundane matters. In the light of the current "war on terrorism" by a
business administration, how salient is Thorstein Veblen's observation
made back in 1904 that "Business interests urge on an aggressive
national policy and businessmen direct it. Such a policy is warlike as
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well as patriotic. The direct cultural value of such a warlike policy is
unequivocal... [channeling] the popular interest to other, nobler,
institutionally less hazardous matters than the unequal distribution of
wealth or of creature comforts." And how well the mainstream U.S.
media serve today to direct the popular interest in this useful
direction!
The results under a free commercial media system are often
staggering in their bias, even Orwellian. One of my favorite
illustrations, because of its Orwellian qualities, was the media's
treatment of the Salvadoran elections of 1982 and 1984, and the
Nicaraguan election of 1984. The Reagan administration supported
the Salvadoran government and elections were held there to put that
government in a good light and make U.S. support for the
militarydominated government palatable to the U.S. public-they
were "demonstration elections.'" In the same time frame the
Nicaraguan government was under attack by the Reaganites, who
tried to discredit its election. A problem for the Reaganites was that
the Salvadoran government was a terror regime that killed an average
of 800 civilians a month in the year up to the March 1982 election. In
addition, the left was off the ballot by law and death threats, and
voting was required by law, reinforced by transparent plastic voting
boxes, registration of votes, and state terror. The government of
Nicaragua wasn't killing civilians, didn't keep anybody off the ballot,
and voting was secret and not mandatory. Nevertheless, in precise
accord with the Reagan agenda, the mainstream media across the
board found the Salvadoran election a "triumph" (Dan Rather) and the
Nicaraguan election a "sham" (New York Times):
Even more beautiful for media analysis, and bringing us into the
realm of George Orwell, the media focused on different subjects in
the approved and disapproved elections. For El Salvador, the focus
was on the turnout of voters-the large turnout was the "triumph" and
the requirement to vote, the absence of secrecy, and the system of
terror, were ignored. The destruction of two independent newspapers
and the inability of the left to run in El Salvador were also not
newsworthy. On the other hand, for Nicaragua, the large turnout was
seen as of little interest, whereas the harassment-not destruction-of
the anti-Sandinista newspaper La Prensa, and the voluntary
withdrawal of a candidate (who, it was belatedly revealed, was on the
CIA payroll), were considered fatal to election integrity.' We may
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recall Orwell's line in his book 1984 on how, under Big Brother, it
was standard procedure to forget something "and then, when it
becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivionT'-like
limits on freedom of the press and the ability of dissident candidates
to run, which the mainstream media drew back from their oblivion in
EI Salvador to help the media (and the Reagan administration)
delegitimize an election in Nicaragua.
This Orwellian process has wide application in the Free Press.
Sticking to Salvadoran elections, back in 1981 the Salvadoran army
issued a death list of 138 Salvadorans, including virtually all
dissidents on the left. The media ignored that at the time of the 1982
election, when publicizing it would have suggested a less than
democratic election. However, in 1989, when the left in El Salvador
felt able to participate tentatively in an election there, the New York
Times finally mentioned the 1981 death list, drawing it back from
oblivion when it could be used to put the 1989 election in a good
light."
For a more up-to-date case, Saddam Hussein had used chemical
weapons against Iran in 1984 and the Iraqi Kurds in 1988, but at that
time he was supported by the United States (and Britain), and his use
of those weapons was materially aided and diplomatically protected
by the Reagan administration (and its British ally). The United States
supplied Saddam with "crop spraying" helicopters that could be used
for the delivery of chemicals against human targets, approved and
provided him with at least 80 shipments of biological agents
(including anthrax), and the United States was the only country to
vote against a March 1986 Security Council condemnation of Iraq for
using chemical warfare.' In those years the mainstream media
followed the government agenda, giving Iraq's use of chemical
warfare little attention. However, at the time of a standoff over
inspections in 1998, and especially in the summer and fall of 2002
when the Bush II administration was trying to make a case for
attacking Iraq, Saddam's use of chemical weapons in the 1980s
became a matter of great interest and high indignation to the U.S.
administrations. The media followed in the official wake, bringing it
back from virtual oblivion.
Thus, for example, Washington Post editorials in 1998, 1999 and
2002 repeatedly and indignantly called attention to the fact that
Saddam Hussein "has used chemical weapons against his own
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people," and the editors concluded in 2002, that "only Saddam
Hussein's removal from power can ultimately erase the threat that Iraq
currently poses to the world. ,,8 But back in the 1980s, when Saddam
used chemical weapons against Iran and "his own people," but was a
U.S. ally, whose use of chemical weapons was accepted and even
helped along by the U.S. leadership. the Post suggested that it was "a
bit odd" to "worry overly about any particular method" of warfare."
During those years it didn't feature in the news or object editorially to
continuing U.S. aid to Saddam, nor did it suggest that he be removed
from power. In fact, it cautiously defended a unanimous Senate
resolution of 1988 for mild sanctions against Saddam on the ground
that it might induce him to stop using chemical weapons against the
Kurds, which would "help establish a more solid basis on which a
relationship can continue!':" What a difference official support and
hostility can make to editorial positions, and to the structure of news
as well!
When the U.N. inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in
December 1998, in preparation for further U.S. and British attacks on
Iraq, the media reported this basis of withdrawal as straightforward
fact: thus the Los Angeles Times noted that "Immediately after
submitting his report on Baghdad's non-compliance, [UNSCOM head
Richard] Butler ordered his inspectors to leave Iraq," and NBC's
Saturday Today also reported that "the U.N. ordered its inspectors to
leave Iraq this morning." But four years later, when the Bush
administration was trying to put Iraq in a bad light and claimed that
Iraq had ordered the inspectors out, the media changed their story to
accommodate: the Los Angeles Times wrote that "it is not known
whether Iraq has rebuilt clandestine nuclear facilities since U.N.
inspectors were forced out in 1998," and Saturday Today said that
Iraq was talking about readmitting U.N. weapons inspectors "after
kicking them out four years ago." This straightforward Orwellian
rewriting of history on this matter was done across the board in the
mainstream media. I I
This points up another Orwellian principle very applicable to the
work of the U.S. mainstream media: in lngsoc, the language of
doublethink in 1984, "any past or future agreement with him [the
demonized enemy] was impossible.... The Party said that Oceania
had never been in alliance with Eurasia. He, Winston Smith, knew
that Oceania had been in alliance with Eurasia so short a time as four
4
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years ago." Well, during and after the Gulf War of 1991 you would
never know from the mainstream media that the United States had
been in alliance with Saddam Hussein up to the day of his invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
There are many other illustrations of the media's adherence to the
Ingsoc principle of conveniently forgetting prior alliances with
demonized enemies. The Cambodian communist leader Pol Pot,
whose violent rule in Cambodia extended from April 1975 to
December 1978, was furiously assailed by U.S. leaders and the media
as "another Hitler" during his time in power. He and his forces were
driven into exile in Thailand by Vietnam in December 1978. But as
the enemy of Vietnam, the United States quietly supported him after
his ouster for more than a decade, giving him aid directly and
indirectly, approving his retention of Cambodia's seat in the UN, and
even bargaining to include him in the election process of the 1990s.
The U.S. media kept this support for "another Hitler" under the rug.
Subsequently, after the Vietnamese left Cambodia in 1995, and Pol
Pot was no longer useful as an enemy of our enemy, he resumed his
status as a villain and war criminal and there was much talk of
whether he could be brought to trial for war crimes. But you would
never know from the U.S. mainstream media that the villain had been
supported by-and was in a de facto alliance with-the United States
for more than ten years."
The U.S. invaded Panama and captured its leader Manuel
Noriega in 1989, allegedly because of his involvement in the drug
trade, but actually because he failed to meet U.S. demands for support
in the war against Nicaragua. Noriega had been involved in the drug
trade for more than a decade in earlier years without causing any
withdrawal of U.S. support. During the period of the invasion,
capture, and trial of Noriega, the mainstream media did not discuss
and reflect on the significance of the earlier support of and agreement
with this demon.
The Taliban government in Afghanistan moved beyond the pale
in 1998, following the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa by
Al-Qaeda cadres affiliated with Osama bin Laden, who made his
headquarters in Afghanistan. Following 9/11, the Taliban, along with
bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, was even more thoroughly demonized by
both the U.S. government and mainstream media. But here again,
while not impossible to find, it would take some effort to locate
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mainstream news reports or commentary recounting the fact that the
Taliban and AI-Qaeda had been organized and supported by the
United States and its allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the 1980s to
fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan. and that the United States had
backed the Taliban's assumption of power in 1996 because it brought
"stability" (and perhaps might make possible the construction of an
oil pipeline through Afghanistan)."
Another Orwellian process that is commonplace in the
mainstream media is "disappearing" people. When the government
agenda calls for this, the media oblige to a remarkable degree. In
Manufacturing Consent, Noam Chomsky and I focused on how
victims are dichotomized as "worthy" and "unworthy" by the media,
the worthy are given intense coverage, the unworthy are treated in
low key or ignored altogether. We gave telling illustrations, and noted
how closely this media dichotomization followed the government's
agenda. Even earlier we had featured how the U.S. media devoted
great attention to Pol Pot's killings in Cambodia, which served the
state agenda of featuring Communist misbehavior, but treated in very
low key Indonesia's almost simultaneous invasion and occupation of
East Timor, which took place with the approval and logistical support
of the U.S. government. And as Indonesian killings in East Timor
peaked in 1977 and 1978, mentions of that occupation in the New
York Times fell to zero-the victims disappeared."
This same Orwellian process can be seen in the recent treatment
of body counts and civilian killings. When the United States kills
civilians, body counts are politically inconvenient as they may
impede the use of advanced weaponry and permit the mobilization of
opposition to U.S. military ventures. For this reason the Pentagon
doesn't count bodies in such cases, and regularly denies charges of
responsibility for major civilian casualties, as in Panama in 1989, Iraq
in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001-2. On the other
hand, the Pentagon and State Department have been deeply concerned
over civilian killings by enemy states, the most notable recent case
being Kosovo during the war with Yugoslavia in 1999."
The media follow along with the Pentagon/State Department
treatment of civilian victims in these cases in a manner similar to their
earlier dichotomous treatment of Cambodia and Jndonesia in East
Timor. The media outdid themselves in their attentiveness to, and
indignation over, Kosovo Albanian victims of Serbia before, during,
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and after the 78-day bombing war in 1999; but their interest in civil-
ian victims in Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan has been very muted if
not absent altogether. Equally interesting has been their treatment of
Iraqi civilian victims of the U.S.-British imposed "sanctions of mass
destruction" on Iraq during the decade following the 1991 war. When
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in answer to a question
on whether 500,000 Iraqi children dying as a result of those sanctions
was defensible, stated on national TV in 1996 that those deaths "were
worth it," no media notice of this exchange followed. These were
unworthy victims whose death flowed from U.S. policy decisions,
and the media's black hole treatment followed. On the other hand,
when 40 Albanians were killed at Racak, Kosovo in January 1999,
offering a casus belli that Madeleine Albright was looking for-
"Spring has come early this year," she said to Sandy Berger-on
hearing of this incident, the media found these victims to be
eminently worthy, and indignant attention followed. I"
This comparative method that I have been describing here is a
very constructive methodology that has been used effectively by
historians such as the great French scholar Marc Bloch as well as by
media analysts." For one thing it is simple and comprehensible, but
grounded in solid factual evidence that is hard to evade. For another,
it can demonstrate media bias in very dramatic fashion, as suggested
by the illustrations I have just presented. If this bias is huge, as I
believe and have easily demonstrated on numerous occasions, it is
surely important to show this and reiterate the point time and again.
After all, demonstrating very serious bias makes the case for the
importance of radical media criticism. At the same time, as this bias
shows media performance that is incompatible with an informed
public and democratic politics, it also points to the urgent need for
radical change in media organization and structure.
What is needed to link the systematic bias to media structures is
a theory that will explain this regular subservience of the commercial
media to agendas of the state and other powerful interests. This is the
function of the propaganda model, which is essentially a power model
that traces media performance to structural and power factors: media
ownership and control; the funding of the media by advertisers;
sourcing processes and the dependence of journalists on "primary
definers" who wield power: flak as a force keeping the media in line,
important cases of which trace back to inputs by powerful people; and
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the ideology of media owners and personnel, which also flows in
good measure from dominant power sources.
The propaganda model cannot explain everything, but it has
proven to be a very useful framework for understanding the forces
that shape many important media choices, many of which, as I have
noted, serve the agendas of the powerful and violate principles that
media personnel and apologists often claim to control their behavior.
One of the criticisms of the propaganda model has been that it
neglects the importance of professionalism in offsetting any bias
arising from structural factors. It has been a major contention of
Professor Dan Hallin, that the maturing of journalistic
professionalism is "central to understanding how the media operate,"
and "surely part of the answer" to reforming and rehabilitating the
public sphere." But professional standards, and the closely associated
rules of objectivity are fuzzy, and their stress on finding credible
sources (also conveniently cheap and with no flak attached) has
entailed fatal compromises with substantive objectivity. Hallin
himself has acknowledged that professionalism has sometimes
allowed thoroughgoing government control via sourcing domination."
In fact, although Hallin has asserted that the propaganda model
couldn't explain media coverage of the Central American wars of the
1980s, and Michael Schudson has pointed to Hallin's studies as
superior in explanatory value to comparable material in Manufactur-
ing Consent, the propaganda model works well for those Central
American struggles, whereas Hallin's effort does poorly. The
propaganda model readily explains the election double standard in
treating El Salvador and Nicaragua, including the spectacular
apologetics for El Salvador's elections held under ongoing state terror.
Hallin admits that "the administration was able more often than not to
prevail in the battle to determine the dominant frame of television
coverage," that "the broad patterns in the framing of the story can be
accounted for almost entirely by the evolution of policy and elite
debate in Washington," and that "coherent statements of alternative
visions of the world order and U.S. policy rarely appeared in the
news.?" This is exactly what the propaganda model would anticipate,
but it is a far cry from news determination based on professionalism
or substantive objectivity.
Hallin also noted that a "nascent alternative perspective" in
reporting on El Salvador-a "human rights" framework-existed but
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"never took hold." The propaganda model can explain this-
professionalism cannot. Nor can professionalism explain why, with
700 journalists present at the Salvadoran election of 1982, many of
whom were allegedly "often skeptical" of election integrity according
to Hallin, the election still yielded a "public relations victory" for the
administration." In this case, professionalism was easily overridden
by power.
Societal changes over the last two decades have strengthened the
explanatory value of the propaganda model and weakened the force
of professionalism in shaping media behavior and performance. Both
corporate and media concentration have increased, and so has the
centralization of political power and greater sophistication of political
leaders in media management. Public relations and advertising have
increased in importance, and the competition for advertising in the
media industries has intensified. Conglomeration, greater pressures
for bottom line performance and competition for advertising, has led
to increasing compromises of editorial independence, cutbacks in
news and editorial staff, and diminished willingness to contest the
powerful. The public sphere has shriveled and the propaganda model
has increased in salience.
The result is an abundance of dramatic cases of the mainstream
media serving as propaganda agents of the state and elite, and failing
to meet minimum public service responsibilities. The opportunities
for enlightening and constructive media analysis are rich. Just open
the newspapers or tum on television and watch a state version of the
"war on terrorism" offered without the slightest vestige of substantive
objectivity: no coherent definition of the word terrorism; no
distinction between retail (individual and small group) and wholesale
(state) terrorism; no analysis of possible hidden agendas in the pursuit
of this war; no historical context. On context, you will not read or
hear any analysis of the analogous Reagan "war on terrorism,"
announced by Reagan's Secretary of State Alexander Haig in January
1981, which covered over a regressive economic agenda, but also, in
historical retrospective, clearly involved massive support of state
terrorists on a global basis (the South African apartheid government,
the Argentine military regime, the El Salvador and Guatemalan
governments, the Nicaragua contras, and the Begin-Sharon invasion
of Lebanon culminating in the Sabra and Shatila massacre).
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This horrendous media performance rests in part on the patriotic
ardour which has gripped the populace since 9/11, which has caused
the Democrats to cease any oppositional stance on the war, giving the
administration a freer hand to keep the pot boiling with daily and
weekly claims, reports and scares. This official propaganda barrage is
not contested by anybody important, and the media feature it
uncritically, serving as de facto propaganda conduits. With the threat
of open aggression against Iraq, and with members of the
establishment as well as virtually the entire rest of the world
questioning this plan, there has been debate. But it is almost entirely
about tactics and whether Iraq poses a sufficient threat to justify a
"regime change" imposed by force. The idea that this is planned
aggression in blatant violation of the U.N. Charter, and therefore an
extreme form of state terrorism, is outside the realm of acceptable
thought.
The potential applications of the comparative method and
propaganda model on media performance today are almost beyond
count, and the payoffs should be substantial. Analyzing the media's
performance in relation to their claims of fairness, lack of bias, and
objectivity is like shooting fish-maybe even dead fish-in a barrel.
But these fish need to be shot. Shooting them should be a high
priority for believers in a democratic media.
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